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Abstract In this paper, we introduce a new cryp-
tographic primitive called Broadcast Encryption
with Dealership (BED). This notion, which has
never been discussed in the cryptography litera-
ture, is applicable to many realistic broadcast ser-
vices, for example subscription-based television ser-
vice. Specifically, the new primitive enables a dealer
to bulk buy the access to some products (e.g. TV
channels) from the broadcaster and hence, it will
enable the dealer to resell the contents to the sub-
scribers with a cheaper rate. Therefore, this cre-
ates business opportunity model for the dealer. We
highlight the security consideration in such a sce-
nario, and capture the security requirements in the
security model. Subsequently, we present a con-
crete scheme, which is proven secure under the De-
cision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DBDHE)
and the Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) assump-
tions.
Keywords Broadcast encryption · dealership ·
provable security
1 Introduction
Pay TV, or sometimes referred to as the subscription-
based television service, provides a mechanism to
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allow the subscribers to view the broadcast en-
crypted channel provided by the TV broadcaster,
provided that the subscribers own a special de-
vice (known as a “decoder”) to join the network.
In practice, a subscriber, Alice, will usually pur-
chase a package that combines several channels
offered by the broadcaster to get a better deal.
Recently, the scenario of Pay TV includes the no-
tion of “dealership”. We note that the term deal-
ership does not refer to a trusted third party, but
instead, it represents an entity who deals with the
broadcaster to offer better price to the subscribers.
This case allows a dealer to purchase some chan-
nels from the broadcaster and to sell them with a
cheaper price. For instance, the dealer, Don, would
purchase 100 access to the sport channel from the
broadcaster and he will be offered a discounted
rate at $ 20 per month, instead of paying the full
fare, which is $ 30 per month for the same con-
tents. This way, now Don can offer his service by
re-selling the channel to the subscribers (who have
owned the decoder), but with a slightly cheaper
rate, for example $ 25 per month. Then, Don can
still make his business meanwhile the subscribers
will enjoy the discounted rate. Of course, it is Don’s
interest to protect the identity of his subscribers
from the original broadcaster or else, the broad-
caster may contact the subscribers directly and
offer a better rate.
Although the scenario of Broadcast Encryp-
tion has been thoroughly studied in the cryptog-
raphy literature [17,15,18,29,13], there exists no
work that discuss the aforementioned realistic sce-
nario to allow Broadcast Encryption with Dealer-
ship. An unattractive solution would be to employ
a fully trusted dealer, which is impractical.
Our work
In this paper, we extend the existing notion of
Broadcast Encryption to enable the notion of Broad-
cast Encryption scheme with Dealership (BED). In
the new notion, there are three types of partici-
pants, namely a broadcaster, a dealer and a set of
subscribers (resp. receivers). In the setup stage, the
subscribers will join as members of the broadcaster
(i.e., by purchasing a decoder). Then, the dealer is
allowed to choose a subgroup of subscribers and
generate an auxiliary information, aux, that will
need to be sent to the broadcaster. Upon receiving
aux, the broadcaster encrypts the purchased chan-
nel using this information such that only a sub-
set of subscribers which have been included in aux
can decrypt the scrambled contents. The broad-
caster can also check the size of aux, but will not
know which subscribers that have been included
in aux. This is to follow the scenario that only the
dealer knows the identity of the subscribers who
have purchased the contents from him/her, but
not the broadcaster, since otherwise, the broad-
caster will be able to approach those subscribers
at a later stage and to offer a better rate com-
pared to the dealer. We provide a sound security
model to capture this scenario, and subsequently
present a concrete construction. Meanwhile, our
scheme is proven secure under the Decision Bi-
linear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DBDHE) and the
Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) assumptions.
One might think that our construction could
be straightforward. Nevertheless, we stress the dif-
ficulty of achieving such a scheme is due to the
necessary security requirements that are required
by each entity in the system. We illustrate some of
the difficulties as follows. From the dealer’s point
of view, he/she prefers to protect the privacy of
the subscribers. This is to protect the dealer’s in-
terest so that the broadcaster cannot approach the
subscribers directly and offer them with a better
price, and hence, disadvantaging the dealer. On
the other hand, the broadcaster must be ensured
that the total number of the subscribers given by
the dealer is limited, and hence, the dealer cannot
cheat by only purchasing the contents for n users
but eventually he/she will resell the contents for
n+ 1 subscribers. Furthermore, we need to guar-
antee that the dealer cannot decrypt the purchased
contents or else, the dealer can later re-broadcast
the information to other illegal subscribers. Simi-
larly, the users who do not subscribe to the channel
should not be allowed to decrypt the broadcast in-
formation as well.
We need to intelligently combine the Broadcast
Encryption scheme and the Membership Encryp-
tion scheme to implement our construction. Using
a simple Broadcast Encryption construction does
not allow the broadcaster to verify the number
of users selected by the dealer. The broadcaster
would not have an interaction with the dealer to
check that the dealer have chosen less than n users.
That means that the broadcaster generates the
public/private key pairs for all the users, the dealer
selects a unknown number of users and encrypts
the message for these users and then, the broad-
caster forwards the ciphertext to all the users such
that only the users selected by the dealer can re-
trieve the original message. A Membership En-
cryption protocol does not keep the idea of broad-
casting a ciphertext to several users. Indeed, there
is only an interaction between a verifier and a prover:
the latter wants to prove that a user A belongs to
the group of users P (G) without revealing other
users in G to the verifier.
In our proposed framework, we adopt some prac-
tical assumptions as follows. We assume that dealer
will not collude with the users, as both entities
have their own separate interest. It is of course
theoretically possible to allow this collusion, but
in our work, we assume that this impractical col-
lusion will not occur. Additionally, we assume that
the dealer is also rational, in the sense that the
dealer will not cheat the users by selling “fake”
membership, which later will allow the users to re-
port the case to the broadcaster and having the
dealer blacklisted from future business. We note
that these assumptions are made in order to fol-
low realistic situation as well as to avoid us having
unnecessary complication in the scheme.
One may note that the notion of BED is sim-
ilar to another concept called Digital Right Man-
agement (DRM) [24]. DRM is a system to protect
high-value digital goods and control the distribu-
tion and usage of these digital goods. A DRM pro-
cess engages four entities: the content provider, the
distributor, the clearing house and the consumer.
A DRM system is included with an e-commerce
system that treats financial payoffs and launches
the function of the clearing house. In a DRM model,
a license is transmitted from the clearing house to
the consumer (who requested it) before or at the
same moment as the transfer of the digital content,
for instance for temporary promotional purposes.
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Furthermore, an extension of DRM systems for
the purpose of managing personal data held and
controlled by organizations was proposed in [23].
In [31], the authors proposed a secure solution to
suit DRM in home networks consisting of con-
sumer electronic devices. One issue is that licences
can leak information about the enterprise data;
and in order to overcome this issue, the Platform
for Privacy Preferences Language (P3P) is used
to communicate enterprise privacy policies to con-
sumers and enable them to easily construct data
licenses [32]. DRM concept can also be extended
to the health domain in order to protect the pri-
vacy of patient’s electronic health records stored
in a cloud storage [22]. Despite all the similari-
ties between the two notions, there are some sub-
tle and important differences between them, which
will be outlined below. We note that we will use
the terms in DRM for the sake of comparison be-
low, but without further elaboration. We refer the
readers to [24] for a more complex account.
We should note that BED and DRM do not
have the same goal, and therefore, there are vari-
ous differences among them. First, a BED system
provides a long-term decoder to the subscribers,
whereas a DRM system offers temporary licenses
to the consumers. These two features imply that
DRM only allows for a discrete access whereas a
BED process works for continuous access. Hence,
DRM can handle a piece of digital contents, such
as music or videoclip, in which their size have been
known a priori. More precisely, in the DRM case,
the temporary license specifies a n-time access (e.g.
“try-before-use” business model) for a piece of dig-
ital content (e.g. music, video). However, in the
BED, the digital content to be broadcasted in a
flow of information, from time t0 until time tm
without interruption (e.g. TV channel broadcast),
via the decoder. Finally, the most distinct feature
is that the BED concept is designed in a multi-user
setting: to reduce the computational and commu-
nication costs, the broadcaster and the dealer in-
teract with the subscribers as a whole. In addi-
tion, the dealer is able to select one part of all the
subscribers; meanwhile, the broadcaster can verify
the number of selected users. In contrast, DRM
schemes propose only one-to-one processes.
In Fig. 1, we highlight the similarities and the
differences between DRM and BED systems.
BED DRM
Long-time decoder/license 3 5
Continuous stream access 3 5
Contents distributed 3 3
in an encrypted form
Multi-user setting 3 5
Selection of users 3 3
depending of the contents
Verification of the number 3 5
of selected users
Table 1 Comparison between DRM and BED systems.
The terminology “user” refers to “consumer” for the DRM
systems and to “subscriber” for the BED system.
1.1 Related Work
The notion of Broadcast Encryption was intro-
duced by Fiat and Naor [17]. In a Broadcast En-
cryption scheme, a sender who would like to share
a message with a dynamically chosen subset S ⊆
[1,N ] of users will construct a ciphertext such that
only users in S can decrypt. Then, he/she can
safely transmit this ciphertext over a broadcast
channel to all users. The main challenge in building
efficient broadcast systems is to encrypt messages
with short ciphertexts. Usually, Broadcast Encryp-
tion systems rely on combinatorial techniques. Such
systems include a collusion bound t, where using
larger values of t impacts system performance.
The concept of Broadcast Encryption receives
much attention since the work of Naor et al. [25]:
they presented a symmetric-key structure together
with security model and security analysis. Dodis
and Fazio [16] presented the first public-key CCA-
secure Broadcast Encryption scheme. Boneh, Gen-
try and Waters [3] designed a fully collusion resis-
tant scheme and proposed a security model where
the adversary can corrupt any user, except the
users in the challenge target set S∗. They pre-
sented new methods for achieving fully collusion
resistant systems with short ciphertexts by apply-
ing computational techniques using group with bi-
linear maps. With their scheme, the adversary has
to provide precisely S∗ prior to knowing the pa-
rameters of the system, and hence, this model is
known as the selective model. Delerabrée construct-
ed a selectively secure ID-based Broadcast Encryp-
tion [13] in the random oracle model. Subsequently,
Gentry and Waters [18] presented the first scheme
in the adaptive model, where the adversary can
corrupt users and then adaptively choose the chal-
lenge target set. They provided adaptively secure
schemes in both the standard and the random or-
acle models. At the same time, [33] used the dual
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encryption technique to build more efficient adap-
tively secure Broadcast Encryption systems than
those obtained from the generic construction based
on schemes with semi-static security. Thereafter, a
scheme achieved all desired properties (constant-
size ciphertexts, adaptive CCA-security) and was
presented in [29] but it relies on rather non-standard
assumptions.
Phan, Pointcheval and Strefler [27] recently gave
a general view of the relations between the secu-
rity notions for Broadcast Encryption. However,
the setting of multi-channel Broadcast Encryption
is out of their consideration, because the adversary
could corrupt some users of one channel to break
the security of the other channels. The sessions
keys of all channels should indeed be compacted
into one ciphertext only, there are thus some rela-
tions between keys inside one session and the secu-
rity model has to take these relations into account.
Finally, Phan, Pointcheval and Trinh [30] made
a significant breakthrough by proposing a formal-
ization of the multi-channel Broadcast Encryption
problem, using the dummy-helper technique.
The privacy-preserving membership proof al-
lows one to prove that a user A belongs to a users
group G, while the privacy is protected. There are
two techniques of privacy-preserving membership
proof:
– Set membership proof [11,10,8] for A∈G given
P (A). In such a proof, the token P (A) and the
users in G are known by a verifier. The goal for
a prover is to show that the user in P (A) is in G
without leaking the identity A to the verifier.
This kind of proof enables us to provide the
privacy of the involved user.
– Accumulator for witness [4,5,26,19,9,1] forA∈
G given P (G). In this case, the token P (G) and
a user A are known by a verifier. The goal of a
prover is to show that A belongs to the group
of users in P (G) without leaking the identities
of the other users in G to the verifier. This kind
of proof allows us to protect the privacy of the
non-involved users.
In [20], Guo et al. proposed an encryption prim-
itive, which is known as the Membership Encryp-
tion. In such a scheme, the decryption satisfies the
privacy-preserving group membership A∈G given
P (G), where the group token P (G) is generated
from the users group G and a secret token S. If
the encryption takes A and P (G) as inputs, the
decryption succeeds if and only if the decryptor
knows (G,S) and A ∈ G is true. They provided
a provably secure Membership Encryption such
that:
– P (G) is constant-size with maximum number
accountability on users, and independent of the
number of users in G, and
– the upper bound user number in P (G) is ac-
countable, the ciphertext is constant-size with
maximum number accountability on users, and
linearly dependent on the length of security pa-
rameter.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we introduce the notion of Broad-
cast Encryption scheme with Dealership (BED).
Our construction is inspired by Gentry and Wa-
ters [18] Broadcast Encryption scheme and by Guo
et al. [20] Membership Encryption scheme, with
some subtle changes. We should note that a triv-
ial merger between these two schemes will result
to an insecure scheme. We proved the security of
the scheme to be semi-static secure under the n-
Decision Bilinear DHE problem, preserving pri-
vacy, and secure with maximum number account-
ability under the (f,n)-DHE problem.
Our scheme is equipped with following security
properties:
– Security against illegal users: A user receiving
a ciphertext of which he/she is not a legal sub-
scriber is unable to decrypt it. Likewise, the
dealer receiving the contents sent by the broad-
caster cannot decrypt them, and thus, cannot
re-broadcast them later to some illegal users.
– Privacy: Even though the broadcaster knows
all the identities of the subscribers, the broad-
caster will not know who are recipients of the
ciphertexts, since the group of recipients is only
known to the dealer.
– Maximum number accountability: The broad-
caster needs to be assured that the total num-
ber of users selected by the dealer is limited,
and thus, the dealer cannot cheat by enabling
the encrypted contents to n+1 subscribers for
the price of n subscribers.
Following the Broadcast Encryption scheme pro-
posed by Gentry and Waters [18], we prove that
our scheme is secure in the semi-static model. In
this model, an adversary must commit to a set S
before the Setup algorithm, but then it can attack
any set S∗ ⊆ S. Thus, the adversary has more flex-
ibility than in the static model.
4
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we will revisit the definition of some
hard problems used in our security proofs. Sec. 3
introduces the syntax of BED that will be used
throughout this paper defines the security models
of BED. In Sec. 4, we present our construction of
the Broadcast Encryption scheme with Dealership,
and give its security proofs in Section 5. The proofs
are provided for semi-static security, privacy and
maximum number accountability. Finally, Sec. 7
concludes the paper.
2 Complexity Assumptions
We first define the two hard problems adopted
in the security proofs of the system: the DBDHE
problem and the DHE problem. The first one was
proposed by Boneh, Gentry and Waters in [3], and
the second one was established by Delerabrée in
[13].
Definition 1 (n-Decision Bilinear DHE prob-
lem) Let G and GT be groups of order p with bi-
linear maps e : G×G→GT , and let g be a genera-
tor for G. Set a,s ∈R Z∗p, and b ∈R {0,1}. If b= 0,
set Z = e(g,g)an+1·s; otherwise, set Z ∈R GT . The
problem instance consists of gs, Z, and the set
{gai ; i∈ [0,n]∪ [n+2,2n]}. The problem is to guess
b.
The n-DBDHE problem holds with t,ε if given
an problem instance generated from a security pa-
rameter 1λ, the advantage of solving this problem
in t polynomial time is ε at most which is a negli-
gible function of λ.
Definition 2 ((f,n)-DHE problem) Let G and
GT be groups of order p with bilinear maps e : G×
G→ GT , and let g0,h0,w be random generators
for G. Set a ∈R Z∗p. The problem instance consists
of a n′-degree polynomial function f(x)∈Zp[x] for
n′ > n, and of g0,ga0 ,ga
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0 , · · · ,ga
n
0 . The problem is
to compute (f(x),gf(a)0 ).
The (f,n)-DHE problem holds with t,ε if given
an problem instance generated from a security pa-
rameter 1λ, the advantage of solving this problem
in t polynomial time is ε at most which is a negli-
gible function of λ.
3 Definition and Security Models
3.1 Definition
Definition 3 A Broadcast Encryption scheme
with Dealership (BED), as depicted in Fig. 1, can
be seen as a key encapsulation mechanism with
Membership Encryption. The scheme comprises the
following six algorithms:
– Setup: (Broadcaster) On input a security pa-
rameter 1λ, an integer n corresponding to the
upper bound number of users, and a group of
users {A1, · · · ,An}, the Setup algorithm gen-
erates the public parameters PP and the mas-
ter secret key MSK, where n= poly(1λ).
– KeyGen: (Broadcaster) On input the public
parameters PP , the master secret key MSK,
and a user Ai for i ∈ [1,n], the KeyGen algo-
rithm generates a public/private key pair (PKi,
SKi).
– GroupGen: (Dealer) On input the public pa-
rameters PP , a group of selected users G =
{A1, · · · ,Ak}, such that 1≤ k≤ n, and the pub-
lic keys {PK1, · · · ,PKk} of the users belonging
to G, the GroupGen algorithm returns the to-
ken P (G).
– Verify: (Broadcaster) On input the token P (G),
and an integer k, the Verify algorithm returns
True if the user number in P (G) satisfies |G| ≤
k; otherwise, it outputs False.
– Encrypt: (Broadcaster) On input the public
parameters PP , a token P (G), and a message
M , the Encrypt algorithm returns a cipher-
text C of M .
– Decrypt: (User) On input a user Ai for i ∈
[1,n], the group of selected users G, the pub-
lic/private key pair (PKi,SKi), and a cipher-
text C, the Decrypt algorithm returns the mes-
sage M or ⊥.
Correctness: For public parameters PP , any to-
ken P (G) corresponding to a group G, and any
ciphertext C←Encrypt(PP,P (G),M), we have:
– if Ai ∈ G, then we have Decrypt(Encrypt
(PP,P (G),M),Ai,G,(PKi,SKi)) =M ;
– otherwise, we have Decrypt(Encrypt(PP,
P (G),M),Ai,G,(PKi,SKi)) =⊥.
3.2 Semi-static Security Model
Below we formalize the security notions for the
BED system. The strongest security model in Broad-
cast Encryption systems is the adaptive secure sys-
















selects G = {Aj1 , · · · , Ajk}




hides Aji ∈ G by
computing token P (G)








for message M on P (G)









if Aj ∈ G
message M
if Aj /∈ G
fail (⊥)
for j ∈ {1, · · · , n}
Fig. 1 Broadcast Encryption with Dealership (BED). The three participants are: the broadcaster B, the dealer D and
the users Aı.
is allowed to see the public parameters (and the
public keys), and then ask several private keys be-
fore choosing the set of indices that it wishes to
attack.
Nevertheless, in this paper, we consider a weaker
security definition: the semi-static security. This
notion was introduced by Gentry and Waters [18]
to prove the security of their Broadcast Encryp-
tion scheme. They also provided a generic tech-
nique to transform a semi-static secure Broadcast
Encryption to an adaptive secure scheme. We note
that their transformation is also applicable to our
scheme, and therefore, we omit the construction of
a fully-secure system in this paper.
In the game for semi-static security, the adver-
sary must commit to a set S of users at the Init
phase. The adversary cannot query a private key
for any Ai ∈ S, and it must choose a target set S∗
for the challenge ciphertext, such that S∗ ⊆ S.
Game for Semi-static Security Model
– Init. The adversary commits a users set S ⊆
{A1, · · · ,An}.
– Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algo-
rithm to obtain the public parameters and the
public keys of users, and sends them to the ad-
versary.
– Key Query Phase. The adversary issues private
key queries for users Ai ∈ {A1, · · · ,An}\S.
– Challenge. The adversary specifies a challenge
set S∗ ⊆ S, such that for all private keys SKi
queries corresponding to users Ai, we have that
Ai /∈ S∗. The challenger runs the GroupGen
algorithm with input S∗ and receives P (S∗).
It then encrypts a message M under PK and
P (S∗) to obtain the ciphertext C0 and C1 ∈R
GT . It sets b ∈R {0,1}, and gives Cb to the
adversary.
– Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ for b,
and wins the game if b′ = b
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We define the advantage of the adversary as
AdvBEDSSA (1λ) = |Pr[b′ = b]−1/2|.
Definition 4 A BED generated with a security
parameter 1λ is semi-static secure with (t,ε) if for
all t-polynomial time adversaries, ε=AdvBEDSSA
(1λ) is a negligible function of λ.
3.3 Privacy
In this paper, we use the word ”privacy“ to de-
note that the broadcaster knows the identities of
all the users (as he generates their public/private
key pairs), but he does not know the identities of
the users selected by the dealer (he only knows the
maximum number of selected users as he gave it
to the dealer as a constraint). The term “privacy”
here does not refer to the complete anonymity to-
wards the users, but we emphasize that the dealer
chooses the privileged users and keeps their iden-
tities secret from the broadcaster.
A BED preserves the privacy of group users. Es-
sentially, it means that given a group token P (G),
where G represents a group of subscribers, and two
user groups G0 = {A1, · · · ,Ak0} and G1 = {A′1, · · · ,
A′k1}, it is computationally hard to decide whether
G=G0 or G=G1.
Game for Privacy
– Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algo-
rithm to generate the public parameters PP ,
and sends them to the adversary.
– Challenge. The adversary gives the challenger
two users group G0 = {A1, · · · , Ak} and G1 =
{A′1, · · · , A′k}, for k <n. The challenger responds
by choosing a bit b ∈ {0,1} at random, and
generating P (Gb) for Gb. Then, the challenger
sends P (Gb) to the adversary.
– Win. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b, and
wins the game if b′ = b.
We define the advantage of the adversary as
AdvBEDPA(1λ) = |Pr[b′ = b]−1/2|.
Definition 5 A BED generated with a security
parameter 1λ preserves the privacy of group to-
kens with (t,ε) if for all t-polynomial time adver-
saries, ε= AdvBEDPA(1λ) is a negligible function
of λ. We say it unconditionally preserves the pri-
vacy of group tokens if ε = 0 for any time t and
PP generated by the adversary.
3.4 Maximum Number Accountability Model
The property of maximum number accountability
ensures the broadcaster that given a group token
P (G), the broadcaster is guaranteed that the en-
crypted contents will only be decryptable by maxi-
mum n users, where |G|= n. Intuitively, BED ver-
ifies the property of maximum number account-
ability, if it is computationally hard to generate a
group token P (G) for G with n users, but the Ver-
ify algorithm outputs |G| ≤ k, for a certain value
k < n given by the broadcaster.
Game for Maximum Number Accountability Model
– Challenge. The challenger runs the Setup al-
gorithm to generate the public parameters and
chooses a value k < n, and sends them to the
adversary.
– Win. The adversary outptus (P (G∗),G∗) and
wins the game if G∗ contains n users but the
Verify algorithm outputs |G∗| ≤ k.
We define the advantage of the adversary as
AdvBEDMNAA (1λ).
Definition 6 A BED generated with a security
parameter 1λ is (t,ε)-secure with maximum num-
ber accountability if for all t-polynomial time ad-
versaries, ε=AdvBEDMNAA (1λ) is a negligible func-
tion of λ.
4 BED Construction
In this section, we present the construction of BED
. Our construction is inspired by Gentry-Waters’
Broadcast Encryption scheme [18] and Guo et al.’s
Membership Encryption scheme [20].
The main difficulty is due to the “right order”
of public keys that is required in the original con-
structions, which will prohibit us to build such a
scheme.
4.1 A Quick Reminder about Membership
Encryption
Membership Encryption was recently initiated by
[20]. Let P (G) be a privacy-preserving token on
a group of users. It is assumed that it is hard to
know the users in G given P (G). The membership
encryption is used to construct the membership
proof A ∈ P (G) with privacy-preserving on users
and the membership.
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In [20], the authors extended their group to-
ken generation from the accumulator scheme in
[26], with two secret keys a and b. The systems
parameter comprises u ∈G and u,ua,ua2 , · · · ,uan ,
ub·a,ub·a
2
, · · · ,ub·an . For G = {A1, · · · ,Ak} ∈ Zp,








where the secret key t is randomly chosen from Zp,
and w3 can be seen as the element for user number
verification. They add the component u
1
(a+A)(b+A)
in the system parametr, and pick r ∈ Zp at ran-
dom. Their approach can be described as follows:








is computable from ur and the system param-
eter.












contains the inversion exponent 1a+A , which is
not computable from ur and the system pa-
rameter.
Finally, the authors use these results to encrypt the
message such that the decryption requires A ∈G.
4.2 A Naive Solution
A naive solution should be to combine the Broad-
cast Encryption scheme in [18] and the Member-
ship Encryption scheme proposed by [20]. Intu-
itively, following the technique of the latter, the
KeyGen algorithm, the broadcaster generates the
public/private key pairs of users in {A1, · · · ,An}.
The public key PKi of user Ai results in the com-
ponents ui = hγα
i and vi = hγβα
i . Thereafter, in
the GroupGen, the dealer chooses k users in {A1,
· · · ,An} to create the group G and then, to com-
pute the group token P (G). We notice that the
group token generation can be seen as an exten-
sion of the accumulator scheme in [26]. The dealer
computes the coefficients Fi of the k-degree poly-
nomial F where the roots are the identities of the












that calculating these products requires to employ
the components u1, · · · ,uk and v1, · · · ,vk in ”right
order”, from the public keys of users A1, · · · ,Ak.
That means that the dealer has a restricted choice
when selecting the users. Indeed, for a certain num-
ber k < n, the k first users of {A1, · · · ,An} should
be selected, namely {A1, · · · ,Ak}. Therefore, this
approach is too restrictive and unrealistic for our
purpose.
Instead, in the algorithm GroupGen, we imag-
ine that the dealer would like to choose the priv-
ileged users without constraint of order. For in-
stance, he picks users A2,A4,A5,A8 (for k = 4 <
n). Following the technique proposed in [20], he
cannot compute P (G) for G = {A2,A4,A5,A8}.
Therefore, we found another technique for letting
the dealer choose the privileged users whatever
their indices and keeping the form of P (G) from
[20], in order to verify the number of selected users.
For that, we do not construct the polynomial F (x)
and we do not directly attribute the (ui,vi) to the
users. Instead, we let the values (ui,vi) public and


















Our BED scheme is as follows.
Let GroupGen(1λ,n) be an algorithm that, on
input the security parameter 1λ, outputs a pairing
group PG = (G,GT ,e,p,g), where G,GT are two
cyclic groups of prime order p = p(1λ,n) > n, g is
a generator of G, and e : G×G→GT is a bilinear
map. The map e satisfies the following properties:
– For all u,v ∈ G, for all a,b ∈ Zp, e(ua,vb) =
e(u,v)ab.
– e(g,g) is a generator of GT .
– Computing e(u,v) for any u,v ∈G is computa-
tionally efficient.
Setup: On input a security parameter 1λ, the
upper bound number of users n and a group of
users {A1, · · · ,An}, the Setup works as follows:
– Choose a pairing group PG = (G,GT ,e,p,g).
– Choose α,β,γ ∈Zp and h∈G at random. Com-
pute e(gγ ,g).
– Compute ui = hγα
i and vi = hγβα
i for i∈ [0,n].
The public parameters PP are defined as PP =
(G,GT ,e,p,g,h,e(gγ ,g),u0, · · · ,un, v0, · · · ,vn) and
the master secret key MSK is defined as MSK =
(α,β,γ).
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KeyGen: On input the public parameters
PP , the master secret key MSK and a user Ai for
i∈ [1,n], the KeyGen algorithm works as follows.
Randomly choose xi,si ∈ Zp and fi ∈G. Compute
the private key SKi = (di0, · · · ,din,) as
di0 = g−si , dii = gγfsii , for i 6= j,dij = f
si
j .
Set the public key as PKi = (xi+α,fi).
GroupGen: On input the public parameters
PP , the group G= {A1, · · · ,Ak} ∈ Zp for any 1≤
k ≤ n, and the public keys {PK1, · · · ,PKk}, the
GroupGen algorithm randomly chooses t1, t2 ∈
Zp and computes P (G) as












































Verify: On input P (G) and k, accept |G| ≤ k
if e(w2,un) = e(w3,uk).
Encrypt: On input the public parameters
PP , a token P (G) = (w1,w2,w3, w4,w5) and a
message M ∈ GT , the Encrypt algorithm works
as follows:
– Verify that w2 = wβ1 by checking e(w1,v0) =
e(w2,u0).
– Randomly choose r ∈ Zp. Compute the cipher-
text C on the message M as







Decrypt: On input a user Ai for i∈ [1,n], the
group of selected users G, the public/private key
pair (PKi,SKi) and a ciphertext C, the Decrypt
algorithm works as follows. Check the cardinality
of the group G: if |G| ≤ k then proceed; otherwise,
abort.
– Compute the pairing
e1 = e(dii ·
∏
Aj∈G\{Ai}
dij , c1) ·e(di0, c2)



















– Compute M by
e−11 · c3 = e(g
γ ,grt2)−1 ·M ·e(gγ ,g)rt2 =M
5 Security Analysis
Prior to presenting our security proofs, we recall
the following facts. The security of the Member-
ship Encryption proposed in [20] relies on several
properties, including the fact that the group token
P (G) is secure with maximum number account-
ability (assuming that the (f,n)-DHE problem is
hard), and unconditionally preserves the privacy of
all users in G. The Gentry-Waters Broadcast En-
cryption [18] is proved semi-statically secure under
the decisional BDHE assumption.
5.1 Semi-Static Security
Intuitively, an adversaryAmust recover e(gγ ,g)rt2
in order to decrypt the ciphertext C. To do this, A
must pair c1 = grt2 from the ciphertext with the
components from some private keys SKi of user
Ai ∈ S∗, where S∗ is the challenge set chose by
A. This will result in the desired value e(gγ ,g)rt2 ,






value val can be retrieved if and only if the user
has the correct key components to cancel out val.
Since the hiding value val is randomized to the
randomness s from private keys of users Ai ∈ S∗,
the attack of A will be successful with negligible
probability. Formally, it is shown as follows.
Theorem 1 (Semi-static security) Let A be a
semi-static adversary against the above system.
Then, there is an algorithm B, which runs in about
the same time as A, such that
AdvBEDSSA (1λ) =AdvBDHEnB(1λ)
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Proof B receives the problem instance, which in-
cludes gs, Z, and the set {gai ; i∈ [0,n]∪[n+2,2n]}.
Init. A commits to a set S ⊆ {A1, · · · ,An} of
users.
Setup. First, B generates y0, · · · ,yn ∈R Zp, and
sets fi = gyi for Ai ∈ S and fi = gyi+a
i for Ai ∈
{A1, · · · ,An}\S. In addition, B sets γ = y0 ·an+1.
It picks at random α,β ∈R Zp, and sets ui = hγα
i =
hy0a
n+1αi and vi = hγβα
i = hy0an+1βαi . It sets the
public parameters as PP = (G,GT ,e,p,g,h,e(gγ ,g),
u0, · · · ,un,v0, · · · ,vn), where e(gγ ,g) can be com-
puted as e(ga,gan)y0 .
Second, for i ∈ [1,n], it randomly chooses xi
from Zp. It set the public key PKi as PKi =
(xi+α,fi), Finally, B sends PP and PKi to A.
Private Keys Queries.A is allowed to query the
private key only for users Ai ∈ {A1, · · · ,An}\S. To
answer the query, B generates zi ∈R Zp, sets si =
zi− y0 · an+1−i, and outputs SKi = (di0, · · · ,din)
where
di0 = g−si , dii = gγ ·fsii , for j 6= i,dij = f
si
j .
B can compute all these components from the prob-
lem instance. For instance,
dii = gγ ·fsii = g
y0·an+1+(yi+ai)(zi−y0·an+1−i)
can be computed since the an+1 term in the expo-
nent cancels out.
Challenge. A chooses a subset S∗ ⊆ S, and B
sets s= rt2 for r, t2 ∈Zp, and C = (c1, c2, c3) where




i and c3 =M ·Zy0 . It sends
C to A.
B can compute these components from the prob-
lem instance, as c1 and c3 come directly from it.
Moreover, since B knows DLg(fi) for all Ai ∈S∗, it











Guess. Finally, A outputs a bit b′. B sends b′
to the challenger.
From A’s point of view, B’s simulation has ex-
actly the same distribution as the semi-static game
defined in [18]. The public and private keys are
appropriately distributed, since γ, and the values
{DLg(fi)}, {si} are uniformly random and inde-
pendent.
When b= 0 in the semi-static game, C is gener-
ated according to the same distribution as in the
real scheme. In B’s simulation, we verify that is
also true: when b= 0, c3 =M ·e(g,g)γ·s, and thus
the challenge is valid ciphertext under the random-
ness s = rt2. When b = 1 in the semi-static game,
C′ = (c1, c2, c′3) is generated as in the real scheme,
but c′3 is replaced by c3 = M · c for c ∈R GT , and
C = (c1, c2, c3) is sent to A. This distribution is
identical to that of B’s simulation, where c1 is valid
for randomness s = rt2, but c = Z is a uniformly
random element of GT .
From this, we see that B’s advantage in decid-
ing the BDHE problem instance is precisely A’s
advantage under the semi-static attack model.
5.2 Privacy
Theorem 2 (Privacy) P (G) unconditionally pre-
serves the privacy of all users in G.
Proof Let P (G) be a group token generated from
G = {A1,A2, · · · ,Ak}, for k < n, and t1 be a ran-
dom exponent in Zp. We have:












































we have P (G) can be also seen as a group token
generated for G′, t′1 and t′2. Therefore, the privacy
of all users in P (G) is unconditionally preserved.
5.3 Maximum Number Accountability
Before giving the formal proof, we first give some
intuition as to why the scheme is secure with maxi-
mum number accountability. According to the set-
ting of our construction, for k selected users, we
have





Through the Verify algorithm, the exponent of w3
contains αn−k which is known by the verifier. We




(xi+α) where the polynomial∏
Ai∈G(xi+x) has at most k degrees. Otherwise,
computing w3 needs hγβα
n+1
, · · · ,hγβαn
′
for n′>n
and these components are not generated during
the Setup algorithm.
Theorem 3 (Maximum number accountabil-
ity) Suppose the (f,n)-DHE problem is hard, the
group token P (G) is secure with maximum number
accountability.
Proof Let A be an adversary who breaks the above
system under maximum number accountability mo-
del. Then, there is an algorithm B that solves the
(f,n)-DHE problem. B interacts with A as follows.
Challenge. Let PG= (G,GT ,e,p,g) be the pair-
ing group. B works as follows to simulate the public
parameters.
– It chooses β0,γ0 at random from Zp, and sets
α= a,β= β0,γ= γ0, where a is the randomness
in the problem instance.
– It randomly picks y ∈ Zp, and sets g = g0,h =
gy0 . Thus, we obtain:











– For i∈ [1,n], it randomly chooses si,xi from Zp
and fi from G. It set the public key as PKi =
(xi+α,fi) = (xi+a,fi), and the private key as
SKi = (di0, · · · ,din), where di0 = g−si = g−si0 ,




i and for j 6= i, dij = f
si
j .
All terms are computable from the problem in-
stance. B generated the public parameters and the
key pairs, and sends it to A.
Win.A outputs (P (G),G,t), whereG= {A1, · · · ,
Ak}, but the Verify algorithm outputs |G| < k.
Let P (G) = (w1,w2,w3,w4,w5,w6). If the Verify
algorithm outputs |G|= k′<k, then we write P (G)
as:















B sets f(x) = yβt1 ·xn−k
′∏
Ai∈G(x+xi), which
is a (n+k−k′)-degree polynomial function in Zp[x],
and outputs (f(x),w3) as the solution to the (f,n)-
DHE problem.
5.4 A Simple and Unsuccessful Attack by the
Dealer
In addition to the security proofs we gave previ-
ously, we quickly describe a simple attack that the
dealer should trigger.
The dealer could select k ≤ n users G1 = {A1,
· · · ,Ak} and to compute w1,w2,w3 regarding G1,
but to add extra users G2 = {Ak+1, · · · ,Ak′}, and
to compute w4,w5,w6 regarding G1 ∪G2. There-
fore, the dealer is successful when the broadcaster
verifies the cardinality of the groups, and the latter
encrypts the message for the group G1∪G2, mean-
ing for more than k selected users. However, when
a user in G1 tries to decrypt the ciphertext, he/she
knows only the identities of other users in G1 (if
G2 becomes public, then the user will discover the
cheating process as the number of selected users
is larger than k). Thus, the decryption fails as the
message cannot be recovered due to the lack of
knowledge of user identities in G2.
More precisely, in GroupGen, the dealer se-
lects two groups of users G1 = {A1, · · · ,Ak} and
G2 = {Ak+1, · · · ,Ak′} for k ≤ n and k < k′, and
randomly chooses t1, t2 ∈ Zp. Then, he/she com-
putes P (G) as follows:
– for the values w1,w2,w3, he/she considers the



































– for the values w4,w5,w6, he/she considers the











Therefore, when running Verify, the broadcaster
accepts as e(w2,un) = e(w3,uk) (this equation is
obtained since |G1| ≤ k). However, when encrypt-
ing, the broadcaster verifies correctly that w2 =wβ1
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and after have chosen r ∈Zp, computes the cipher-
text C as







Thus, the broadcaster encrypts the message for
more than k users. Finally, when running Decrypt,
we have two cases:
– the user belongs to G1. We recall that the user
runs the Verify algorithm for the token P (G)
to make sure that G has the right cardinality.
If he/she knows the identities of G1∪G2 then
he/she aborts as k < |G1 ∪G2| ≤ k′. If he/she
only knows the identities in G1 then he/she
proceeds as G1 ≤ k but cannot achieve to re-
trieve the message M as
e1 = e(dii ·
∏
Aj∈G1\{Ai}
dij , c1) ·e(di0, c2)






















– the user belongs to G2. We recall that the user
runs the Verify algorithm for the token P (G)
to make sure that G has the right cardinality.
If he/she knows the identities of G1∪G2 then
he/she aborts as k < |G1 ∪G2| ≤ k′. If he/she
only knows the identities in G2 then he/she
proceeds if G2 ≤ k (otherwise, he aborts), but
cannot achieve to retrieve the message M as
e1 = e(dii ·
∏
Aj∈G2\{Ai}
dij , c1) ·e(di0, c2)






















Eventually, after having aborted because of the
wrong cardinality of the user group, the user re-
ports to the broadcaster the possible misbehavior
of the dealer.
Remarks: Identification of a cheating dealer. As
mentioned previously, in our proposed framework,
we adopt some practical assumptions that the dealer
is indeed rational. If the dealer cheats, then the
dealer will be blacklisted and he/she will be ex-
cluded from the future business. In the descrip-
tion of the decryption algorithm, this cheating be-
haviour can in fact be identified by the user. No-
tice that a valid user will have two cases upon
conducting the decryption. For the second sub-
case of case 1, the user only knows the identities




?= e(g,c2) holds. If this equation
does not hold, then c2 must have been encrypted
under a set that is not equal to G1, and this may
indicate that the dealer cheats. Similarly, the same
method is applicable to the second sub-case of case
2, i.e. when the user only knows the identities of
G2. We note that we do not regard this as part
of our proposed framework since in practice, this
matter may not concern the user as long as he/she
will be able to decrypt the contents.
6 Complexity Analysis and Evaluation of
the Performance
6.1 Complexity Analysis
In Table 2, we present the complexity analysis of
our scheme.
We notice that the algorithms Setup and Key-
Gen are linear in the number of users n. However,
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Algorithm Exp. Exp. Inv. Pairings
in G in GT in GT
Setup 2n + 3 1
KeyGen n + 2
GroupGen k + 4 1
Verify 2
Encrypt 3 1 1
Decrypt 1 2
Total 3n + k 2 1 6
+12
Table 2 Group exponentiation and pairing benchmarks.
Exp. and Inv. denote the number of exponentiations and
inversions in the groups, respectively. n and k denote the
number of users and the number of selected users, respec-
tively.
this does not impose a big problem since the com-
putation cost of the algorithm Setup will only be
invoked once. One may notice that an improve-
ment to the scheme can be done towards the algo-
rithm KeyGen, as this algorithm needs to be ex-
ecuted for every single user. Nevertheless, we also
note that this algorithm will only be executed once
for all the users involved. More importantly, the al-
gorithm GroupGen could be more faster than the
algorithms Setup and KeyGen, even if it is linear
in the number of selected users k, supposed that
k << n. The rest of algorithms are constant-time,
which is ideal. Indeed, we can imagine that once
the keys are generated for all users and the group
of selected users is created, the system can run en-
cryptions and decryptions fast and efficiently.
6.2 Evaluation of the Performance
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our
scheme. We measure our results using the widely
accepted cryptographic operation implementations
(exponentiations and pairings) using the MIRACL
library, provided by Certivox for the MIRACL Au-
thentication Server Project Wiki. The following
experiments were conducted with Borland C/C++
Compiler/Assembler and tested on a processor 2.4
GHz Intel i5 520M.
For symmetric pairing-based systems, AES with
a 80-bit key and a Super Singular curve over GFp,
for a 512-bit modulus p and an embedding degree
equal to 2, are used.
In Table 3, we evaluate the efficiency of our
scheme. Without losing generality, we assume that
the number of users is n = 1000 and the number
of selected users is k = 100.
Algorithm Exp. Exp. Inv. Pairings
in G in GT in GT
Time (ms)/





Encrypt 4.47 0.36 3.34
Decrypt 0.36 6.68
Table 3 Timings for symmetric and asymmetric pairing
types and pairing-based systems. Times are in millisec-
onds (ms). Exp. and Inv. denote the number of exponen-
tiations and inversions in the groups, respectively.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced the notion of Broad-
cast Encryption scheme with Dealership. We pre-
sented a realistic scenario that requires this kind
of cryptographic primitives. Furthermore, we dis-
cussed the security issues that raise in this kind
of scenario. We presented a set of security models
to capture these requirements, and subsequently
presented a concrete scheme, which is provably se-
cure under DBDHE and DHE assumptions. The
follow up work from here is the effort on obtaining
an efficient generic construction of such a scheme,
and compare it with the concrete scheme that we
presented in this paper.
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